Analysis and Recommendations for Boeing’s Board and CEO

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Introduction

Boeing 737 MAX 8 crashes in 2018 and 2019 killed 346 (Sterman & Quinn, 2023). Aviation design problems like the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, corporate governance, regulatory monitoring, and company culture shortcomings caused these disasters. Afterward, the FAA, Boeing management, and aviation community were scrutinized. Poor openness and the company’s initial reaction worsened things. 737 MAX 8 disasters raised questions about Boeing’s engineering, safety, and profit-driven vs. safety concerns. Unsuitable new system pilot training and certification issues contributed. Disaster avoidance is Boeing’s Board and CEO’s top priority, according to this report. For Boeing’s safety, transparency, and accountability, it will provide extensive management counsel. We want to rebuild public, regulator, and stakeholder confidence while preserving aviation safety and integrity.

Key Issues the Board and CEO Must Focus On

1. Corporate Culture and Management Responsibility

When Boeing merged with McDonnell Douglas in the late 1990s, its culture shifted. Financial profit, cost-cutting, and aggressive timelines replaced engineering excellence. Though financially beneficial, this change degraded safety and quality. This move had severe implications during 737 MAX 8 development, when personnel were under great pressure to meet timetables and budgets. Collings, David, et al. (2022) Engineers and test pilots raised worries about the hurried design and safety, but nothing was done. After the merger, Boeing’s management struggled to reconcile safety and economics. Unfortunately, this balance favored speed and efficiency above safety. Thus, the 737 MAX 8’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System is poorly designed. Due to tight deadlines, technological issues, testing, and regulator-airline communication were overlooked.

Focus Areas for the Board and CEO:

  • Culture Shift: The Board must prioritize safety and quality as Boeing pre-acquisition. Prioritizing safety before profit requires a major shift. Openness and accountability must be encouraged so employees may raise concerns without consequences. A structured feedback framework ensures management listens and acts on engineer and ground staff complaints.
  • Leadership Restructuring: The CEO and leadership team must reorganize the organization to allow engineers and safety officers greater design and production input. This means emphasizing safety issues in decision-making and providing engineers more technical flexibility without corporate interference.

2. Transparency and Accountability

Openness and accountability are Boeing’s catastrophe response. Internal email shows Boeing engineers and test pilots knew about MCAS issues before the catastrophes. Boeing knew about these concerns but did not remedy them or alert the FAA, airlines, or pilots. Beckman (2024) the company minimized the issue to reduce redesign and retraining costs, which had catastrophic consequences. Boeing first blamed airline maintenance or pilot mistake, disregarding 737 MAX 8 design issues. Victim families, regulators, and the public were frustrated. The corporation lost public trust by taking too long to update the MCAS system and provide crucial facts.

Focus Areas for the Board and CEO:

  • Accountability Mechanisms: Top leadership must answer to the Board for not revealing MCAS and responding before accidents. Report and resolve safety issues quickly at the highest levels of management with clear responsibility. Safety monitoring falls on the CEO and top engineers.
  • Enhanced Communication Protocols: According to Imad, Raushan, Elbuzidi, and Chan (2021) Boeing should increase stakeholder communication for transparency. Internal stakeholders include engineers, test pilots, and workers; external stakeholders include regulators, customers, and the public. An open-door policy should encourage employees to report safety issues without consequences. Early detection and aggressive communication with authorities should communicate vital safety information.

3. Regulatory Oversight and Certification Process

FAA clearance was a significant 737 MAX 8 development failure. Boeing downplayed the 737 MAX enhancements, especially the MCAS system, to compete with Airbus and meet market requirements. This made the FAA see the software system as a minor 737 design modification. This system was inadequately monitored and ignored safety risks. Pilots were unprepared for MCAS system failures, and regulators and airlines were ignorant of the technology’s flaws. MCAS and other aircraft safety measures were not tested during the rushed certification process. Lack of paperwork and safety measures like the AOA disagree warning slowed certification.

Focus Areas for the Board and CEO:

  • Reevaluation of FAA Relationship: The Board should review Boeing’s FAA and other regulatory ties. Campos (2025) Boeing should advocate for a more rigorous and transparent certification process that tests and assesses all airplane components. This requires working with authorities to evaluate systems like MCAS before using them in commercial aircraft.
  • Advocating for Stricter Safety Protocols: The Boeing CEO and management should promote stricter aircraft safety protocols and certifications. This includes campaigning for regulatory control beyond certification and addressing aviation system safety problems.

4. Pilot Training and Safety Features

737 MAX 8 accidents were linked to poor pilot training. Pilots were not advised about MCAS or prepared to handle a problem. The catastrophic mishaps were caused by pilots being shocked by the system’s behavior and lacking the abilities to override it. AOA disagree warnings are not on all 737 MAX 8s. These safety measures might have notified pilots of sensor failures and prevented accidents. Boeing offered these features as options without warning consumers of the risks.

Focus Areas for the Board and CEO:

  • Comprehensive Pilot Training: The board must direct the CEO to create a rigorous pilot training program for any new systems, particularly automated ones like MCAS. Intensive flight simulator training should supplement classroom learning. Pilots should be emergency-ready.
  • Standardization of Safety Features: CEOs should compel standardization of crucial safety features like the AOA disagree alert before delivering aircraft. Pilots require fully functional and proven safety tools to detect and remedy flying issues.

Recommendations for Management

1. Prioritize Safety and Quality in All Operations

Appicharla (2023) Boeing must prioritize safety and quality in all operations as its biggest change. This requires a cultural change that prioritizes safety above timelines and expense. Boeing management should let employee’s express concerns and enhance quality. From aircraft design and manufacturing to after-sales service, management must underscore Boeing’s safety commitment. Boeing may be known for supporting customer and employee safety throughout the product lifecycle. New systems and software should be thoroughly assessed before introduction to reduce hazards.

2. Revise the Certification and Testing Process

Boeing must adjust its FAA and other regulatory certification and testing methods. New technology, including safety systems like the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), should be independently tested by the company. This examines how new technologies may fail or threaten passengers. Management should advocate for more certification oversight and transparency to ensure regulators understand design changes and technology developments. For the greatest safety requirements, engineers need time, resources, and autonomy to test and verify aircraft before commercial operation.

3. Develop a Robust Crisis Management and Communication Strategy

Boeing was criticized for their defensive, opaque, and delayed response to the 737 MAX 8 disasters. Jong and Broekman (2021) Boeing requires an effective crisis management plan to recover and prevent mistakes. This crisis communication strategy should clearly address internal and external stakeholders. Communicate directly with victim families, airlines, and regulators for empathy and accountability. Management should also instruct Boeing’s PR staff to be honest and reestablish trust during crises. This approach should also include ways to quickly resolve safety issues and notify the public and stakeholders of corrective actions.

4. Invest in Continuous Improvement of Design and Manufacturing Processes

Thompson (2024) Boeing must invest in R&D to improve aircraft design and manufacturing for safety and reliability. This investment should focus on fail-safe technology to build aircraft resilience and minimize catastrophic failure. For quality control, the company should tighten manufacturing techniques. Engineers need time and money to complete the toughest safety checks before delivering aircraft to customers. Boeing can lead aviation safety and innovation by continuously improving and building a stronger, more reliable product.

Conclusion

The Boeing 737 MAX 8 crashes were caused by technical flaws, poor management, inadequate regulation, and a profit-driven culture. Post-event Boeing safety, transparency, and accountability required improvement. To avoid such tragedies and restore public trust, the Board and CEO must prioritize safety from design to manufacture and beyond. Safety, certification, crisis communication, and continuous improvement help Boeing recover, says this research. Learning from past failures will help the firm lead aviation safety and prevent disasters. Quality, safety, and openness may help Boeing regain global aviation dominance, but it will take time. Boeing can boost aviation trust by reverting to these values.

Reference

Appicharla, S. (2023). The Boeing 737 MAX 8 crashes. Safety-Critical Systems, 2(1).

Beckman, G. (2024). The downfall of Boeing: Its planes and company. CounterPunch.

 Braga da Costa Campos, L. M. (2025). The two Boeing 737 Max accidents and consequences for aircraft certification. In Accelerating Sustainable Aviation Initiatives: Technology, Markets and Social Issues (pp. 83-131). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.

Collings, D., et al. (2022). The effects of negative reputational contagion on international airlines: The case of the Boeing 737-MAX disasters. International Review of Financial Analysis, 80, 102048.

 Imad, A. R., Elbuzidi, K. J. S., & Chan, T.-J. (2021). Crisis management and communication approach: A case of Boeing 737 MAX. Journal of Arts & Social Sciences, 4(2), 7-14.

Jong, W., & Broekman, P. (2021). Crisis history and hindsight: A stakeholder perspective on the case of Boeing 737-Max. Public Relations Inquiry, 10(2), 185-196.

Sterman, J., & Quinn, J. (2023). Boeing’s 737 MAX 8 Disasters.

Thompson, D. (2024). Boeing 737 Max crisis of 2018–2019: A content analysis. Proceedings of the 37th International RAIS Conference on Social Sciences and Humanities, 2, Scientia Moralitas Research Institute.